



























Another private equity boom has passed, 
but the underlying need for the industry has not
I
n the mid-1980s, Meineke Discount Muffler had a problem. Automakers began
fitting their cars with stainless-steel mufflers with life spans of 12 years. Until
then, cars had been fitted with cold-rolled steel mufflers, which rusted after three
years. This innovation was worrying for the Charlotte, N.C.-based company
because a huge chunk of its business, about 65 percent in 1995, depended on 
short-lived mufflers.
Meineke managers were determined to find new ways to
grow, but its parent company, an Australian multinational,
wasn’t too interested in investing in new plans. “They were
very forthright about it,” says Kenneth Walker, Meineke’s
president and chief executive. Meineke’s role in the parent
company’s portfolio was mainly to generate cash, which the
parent wanted to spend in other ways. 
Meineke executives longed to be independent, a wish
that was fulfilled in August 2003 when two private equity
firms, Carousel Capital, located just down the street from
the Meineke headquarters, and The Halifax Group, 
which has offices in Washington, D.C.; Dallas, Texas; and
Raleigh, N.C., helped management buy Meineke from its
parent company for $68.5 million. Meineke changed its
name to Meineke Car Care Center and was transformed into
an independent company with a more diverse service 
offering, significantly improved marketing, and increased
sales and profits. Carousel and Halifax assisted Meineke to
get to that point in more ways than just injecting capital. 
Less than two years after buying Meineke, Carousel and
Halifax sold their investment and another private equity
firm stepped in.
Hundreds of deals involving private equity firms take
place in the country every year. For more than 25 years, the
private equity industry has been an important source of
funds for a number of groups: entrepreneurs starting a 
business; families wishing to sell the business after the death
or retirement of a founder; firms with strong growth
prospects but in need of capital; companies in financial 
distress; and publicly listed companies seeking to go private.
Private equity managers typically restructure the companies
they buy and sell them later, keeping a part of the profits and 
giving the rest to investors.
Often, the deals take place with little publicity. Others
are more high-profile, like the infamous takeover of RJR
Nabisco in 1988 by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., one of
the world’s largest private equity firms. That deal inspired a
book and a movie, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR
Nabisco, a title that suggests the kind of reputation which
private equity firms had then and have even today.
Private equity has burst into the limelight again in recent
years, primarily because of the large amounts of capital that
some groups have been able to raise, as well as the size of the
deals that have been made. In the 1980s, a $200 million to
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$300 million fund would have been
considered large. But today, that’s just
a fraction of the $21.7 billion fund 
that Blackstone, another large private 
equity firm, raised in 2007. 
The large influx of money from 
various investors, favorable credit 
conditions, and the willingness to
form “club deals” allowed private 
equity firms to splurge on buyouts of
some big-name companies. Chrysler,
Hilton Hotels, and Hertz are just a few
names. In the United States, the num-
ber of private equity-backed mergers
and acquisitions (M&As) with values
topping $1 billion jumped from eight
in 2002 to 102 in 2007, according to
Thomson Financial.
But private equity is not just about
the deals and the firms that make the
splashy headlines. About nine out of
10 private equity-backed M&A deals
worldwide were less than $1 billion in
the last three years, and seven out of
10 were under $250 million. 
Critics are skeptical whether 
private equity firms leave companies
better off in the long run. They cite
the quick flips, the sometimes ruth-
less, cost-cutting way private equity
firms go about getting results, and the
seemingly nonchalant way they spend
money. The current turmoil in the
credit markets, which will likely be
painful for private equity firms in
terms of their ability to finance deals
and the returns that they can expect,
has prompted questions on whether
this is the end of private equity. 
That seems doubtful as past waves
have shown. The private equity market
tends to be cyclical. Moreover, most
academic studies suggest that private
equity firms do enhance the perform-
ance of the companies they purchase.
The new owners, refining techniques
developed over many deals, introduce
strategies to make their companies
more efficient. If so, then why is this
industry so controversial? Part of the
problem is the veil of secrecy that sur-
rounds it. “This is still in many
respect[s] a very mysterious business,”
said Harvard Business School’s Josh
Lerner at a private equity conference
organized last fall by the think tank
American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
“There is a lot which is not really
understood about it, and a lot of 
what seems to be understood is
absolutely wrong.”
What is Private Equity?
The private equity market is one 
way through which companies can
obtain funds. Investors provide capital
in exchange for ownership shares 
in  companies that are not traded in 
public markets, hence the name 
“private equity.” But instead of invest-
ing directly in private companies,
investors or the “limited partners” —
typically big groups like public and
corporate pension funds, financial
institutions, college endowments, and
sovereign wealth funds or very wealthy
individuals — place their money in the
hands of a team of professionals, 
or the “general partners.” The general 
partners then select and manage a
portfolio of companies on their behalf.
Private equity investing took off in
the early 1980s thanks in part to the
widespread adoption of this limited
partnership arrangement. The other
big boost came in 1978 from a ruling
that putting money in seemingly risky
private equity funds did not violate 
the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act’s (ERISA) “prudent man”
requirement for investing private 
pension funds, as long as these invest-
ments were part of a larger pool. As a
result, venture capital partnerships —
the predominant private equity
activity at that time — raised $50 
million in the first six months of 1979
from pension plans governed by
ERISA, up from less than $5 million a
year between 1976 and 1978. 
During the life of the partnership,
usually about 10 to 12 years, the
investors’ money is tied up and they
have little control over how it is 
managed. It might seem that investors
would be better off without an inter-
mediary. However, this would involve
identifying and monitoring each of
their investments. Effective private
equity investing requires considerable
skill in choosing and structuring
investments as well as in providing
business advice to acquired compa-
nies, expertise that firms presumably
have gained through participating in a
large number of deals. Thus, working
through a private equity firm can be
better than investing directly provided
the limited and general partners’ inter-
ests and incentives are well-aligned. 
The compensation structure 
provides this control — as well as a
lucrative way to reward general 
partners for good performance. When
Winter 2008 • Region Focus 13a private equity firm sells a
portfolio company, the firm
returns the investors’ capital
and whatever remains is split
between the general and limit-
ed partners. Investors typically
take 80 percent of the profit,
and the private equity firm gets
20 percent or what the industry
calls the firm’s “carried inter-
est.” The bigger the profit, the
larger the firm’s share of the
pie, which is a powerful incen-
tive to invest well. Limited
partners also pay management
fees equal to about 2 percent of
the amount of capital they commit to
a fund. But these fees are not based on
performance and are intended to cover
basic expenses.
Reputation is also a valuable incen-
tive. Private equity managers are eager
to establish a good record because that
determines their ability to raise more
funds from investors and lenders in
the future. Partnerships have a finite
lifetime, and if a private equity firm
earned a low return on its last fund,
investors would seek other places to
put their money.
From the portfolio companies’ 
perspective, private equity can be a
good alternative, especially if they are
unable to raise capital from other
sources such as banks or the public
market. For instance, firms with high-
growth prospects that are young 
and untested might benefit from 
venture capital, which is a type of 
private equity investment. America’s
venture capitalists have financed well-
known companies like Google, Apple
Computer, and Intel. 
Smaller family firms may have
opportunities to grow but are
resource-constrained. The founder
may have to put in more of his own
money, but he can only do that 
for so long. “Their family and friends 
network is only so big and so they need
to go to an outsider,” says Fred Russell,
managing director and CEO of
Virginia Capital Partners, a small 
private equity firm in Richmond. Also,
as the founder of the firm ages, he may
want to retire and sell the business.
The issue of succession applies to
middle-market family firms and 
closely held private companies as well,
which are typically bigger, well-
established companies with stable
cash flows. The company may be sold
to the heirs of the founding family or a
new management team in partnership
with a private equity firm that 
organizes the funds for the sale.
Middle-market firms may also be
looking for capital to finance an
expansion or acquisition. Depending
on their size, these firms do have
access to debt markets, but that may
not be sufficient to meet their financ-
ing needs. And because they may have
no desire to go public, private equity
can be a good option. 
But perhaps the most familiar 
private equity transactions today are
buyouts of public companies. Many
people have probably heard of a lever-
aged buyout, which is a common way
of taking over a big public company
using a substantial amount of debt.
Public companies go private so they
can have a freer hand in making adjust-
ments that will benefit the company,
without having to constantly worry
about short-run fluctuations in their
stock prices, the costs of compliance
imposed on public companies by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and various pres-
sure groups. Of course, CEOs will still
have a boss: the private equity firm. 
Inside a Deal 
Private equity firms buy shares in 
private companies that they hope to
sell later at a higher price.
Companies typically go
through a process of what
Harvard’s Lerner calls “inten-
sive therapy.” This process can
be painful as private equity
firms work to weed out ineffi-
ciencies. But the hope is that
companies will emerge health-
ier, more profitable, and more
valuable. How do they do this?
Areport by consulting firm
McKinsey & Company finds
that in the best-performing
deals, partners devoted more
than half their time to a port-
folio company during the first 100
days and met with top executives
almost every day. Carousel Capital
likewise thinks this is a key factor in
determining the success of an invest-
ment. “We’re a big believer that
investing relatively close to home is a
good practice, because it promotes so
much interaction between the
investors and the management team,”
says Brian Bailey, one of Carousel’s
managing partners.
Carousel prefers to invest in the
Southeast so that the partners can 
easily get to their companies and
spend more time with management
when needed. Meineke’s Walker
talked with his primary contacts at
both firms about once a month, if not
once a week. Although few private
equity firms are located just a few
blocks from one of their portfolio
companies, he could sometimes meet
up with a Carousel partner for lunch
and talk business. “It was an informal
way to stay connected with one of the
partners,” says Walker. 
Private equity firms are demanding
bosses. “If you talk to managers who
work with private equity partners on
their board … ‘anxious vigilance’ can
sometimes describe their world,” said
economist Karen Wruck of Ohio State
University at the AEI conference.
General partners “vigorously exercise
their governance rights,” said Wruck.
Running the business becomes a much
more intense process, where private
equity partners ask tough questions
and make managers understand how



































































The value of private equity deals surged to about a third 
of all merger and acquisition deals in 2007. However, 
analysts say that private equity activity slowed in the last
few months of that year.
SOURCE: Thomson Financial United States Worldtheir decisions affect the value of the
company. It’s not so much that private
equity firms always know how to 
run a specific business. Their knack is 
in finding the right people and 
organizing the company in such a way
that they let managers use their
expertise but hold them closely
accountable for the results. Private
equity firms can get very good at
employing the same principles over
and over again — applied many times
to different deals and companies.
Changing the capital structure of a
company through a leveraged buyout
is another way to align the incentives
of management and shareholders, but
private equity firms often get much
flak for using a lot of leverage.
Borrowing to finance a buyout allows
private equity firms to purchase com-
panies with only a small amount of
equity capital, and shareholders to
receive very high returns. Say, for
example, a private equity firm buys 
a company for $100 million, using 
$30 million of its own equity capital
and $70 million in borrowed funds. 
If the private equity firm later sells 
it for $130 million, then, after repaying
the debt, the investors actually 
double their money even though the 
company’s value rose by only 30 
percent. The gains flow mostly to
equity holders because debt holders
receive only a fixed rate of return.
Critics say, however, that piling on
debt makes a company more vulnera-
ble to going bust and therefore poses a
risk to the economy.
But leveraging can be a powerful
tool in changing the way managers
behave. Economist Michael Jensen 
of the Harvard Business School noted
almost two decades ago that a central
weakness of a public company is the
inherent conflict between owners and
managers of a firm over the control
and use of corporate resources. 
In particular, managers of public 
companies may be hesitant to 
distribute the extra cash that is left
over (after all profitable investments
have been funded) to shareholders 
in the form of dividends. Managers 
want to hold on to this extra cash
because it makes them less dependent
on the capital markets.
This may, however, lead to a 
temptation to invest in wasteful 
projects if they no longer need to 
convince providers of capital each
time of the soundness of their invest-
ment plans. Borrowing, therefore, 
can impose discipline on company 
managers. Since interest is paid out 
of a company’s cash flows, paying 
off debt is in effect a substitute for
paying dividends. Debt can improve
the company’s performance because
managers must make sure that there 
is enough cash to meet interest pay-
ments and because they are dissuaded
from squandering company funds.
Aleveraged buyout also puts equity
in the hands of a smaller group 
of investors, which mitigates the 
problem of monitoring managers
when there are many dispersed share-
holders. Moreover, buyouts usually
dictate that managers invest their own
money in a substantial stake in the
company, so they’re given a bigger
chance to participate in the success (or
the failure) of the company. CEOs of
portfolio companies tend to own a
larger share of the company than their
counterparts at public corporations,
and this can be a powerful incentive. 
Leveraging is an important part of
the private equity firms’ tool box, but
it is no longer a strategy that is only
available to private equity firms. So,
even as firms apply financial and 
governance techniques, they also focus
specifically on improving their portfo-
lio companies’ operations, by building
industry expertise and bringing in
operations specialists and consulting
groups to help them identify points for
improvement. Some of these measures
include reducing costs, for which 
private equity firms are sometimes
heavily criticized. But even as they cut
and tighten, buyout shops today also
look for opportunities to expand the
reach of their companies’ products in
this country or abroad.
While it is possible for public 
companies to employ these same 
techniques without having to go 
private, it may be difficult to do in
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Private Equity’s Impact on Jobs
There are other ways to measure the private
equity industry’s contributions apart from
financial returns. A 2007 Journal of Corporate
Finance paper surveys U.S., U.K., and other
country studies on the real effects of buyouts.
The summary finding is that buyouts
“enhance performance and have a salient
effect on work practices” of their portfolio
companies. For instance, plant productivity
increased substantially after a buyout.
However, much media attention has focused
on employment numbers. Critics, in particu-
lar, have often accused private equity firms of
enriching themselves while slashing jobs in
the process. 
That private equity destroys jobs is not
completely untrue. “It’s not that it’s an inaccu-
rate claim, but when you fill out the whole
picture, the story is much more mixed,” says
University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business economist Steven Davis, who 
co-authored a large-scale study of the 
employment impact of buyouts on U.S. estab-
lishments. “I don’t think the story fits with
the narrative that the critics have put forth,
nor does it really fit the sometimes glowing
testimonials from the private equity commu-
nity itself,” says Davis in an interview.
The study, published in the January 2008
World Economic Forum report, follows target
businesses before and after the buyout trans-
action, and then compares them with other
establishments with no ties to private equity.
When broken down in terms of job creation
and destruction, target establishments are
cutting jobs at a faster rate than comparable
businesses, but target businesses create 
jobs at a similar pace. This suggests that 
private equity firms start out with some 
“housecleaning” of businesses which seem to
be already in distress even before the buyout,
as the study finds. 
But companies also expand their 
businesses, and thus employment, when they
open new manufacturing plants, retail 
locations, and other facilities. Thus, to 
complete the picture, the authors look at jobs
create by private equity-backed companies at
these newly opened establishments. Private
equity emerges the winner: They find that 
target firms create jobs at a much faster rate
than firms with no ties to private equity.
Overall, it appears that job losses are partly
offset by job gains from this expansion.
— VANESSA SUMOpractice, particularly with respect to
governance. In portfolio companies,
CEOs effectively have a boss. In a
public corporation, by contrast, CEOs
typically don’t have one. Jensen, who
also spoke at the AEI conference, 
said that the board of directors of a
public corporation generally see 
themselves as employees of the CEO.
This situation changes only in the
event of a crisis, but by that time, 
too much inefficiency has already set
in. (Public-to-private transactions
account for about a quarter of all 
buyouts worldwide in terms of dollar
value, according to a recent World
Economic Forum report. Most buy-
outs are acquisitions of private firms
and corporate divisions.)
In the end, whether the hard work
has paid off partly depends on the 
private equity firms’ ability to “exit” an
investment well; that is, to find the
right buyer. An exit route can be
arranged through an initial public
offering (IPO) of the company, 
accomplished by selling shares in 
the public market or by selling the 
business to another company or 
private equity firm. 
In Meineke’s case, the partners had
a five-year plan that they achieved 
in less than two years, and everybody
around the table agreed that it 
was time to move on. “Companies do 
get to a certain point in their life 
cycle where they would perhaps 
benefit from another owner,” says
Bailey. Carousel and Halifax were
bought out by Allied Capital, a 
private equity firm based in
Washington, D.C., together with
Meineke’s management. Carousel and
Halifax say they earned more 
than their typical annualized target
return of 25 percent. “They were the
right partners at the right time,”
Walker says.
Measuring Performance 
If you ask Walker, he’ll say that private
equity firms do create value. His big
idea was that the company could grow
quickly and profitably by buying other
franchise automotive brands while
taking advantage of the company’s
back-end resources, which include the
accounting, legal, and financial man-
agement departments. He was proven
correct. “It was private equity that
allowed us to do that,” says Walker. “It
just allowed us to be a more efficient
company.”
However, others are more doubtful
about the merits of private equity. The
quick flip is one tactic that doesn’t
come across favorably, with many 
asking whether overleveraged compa-
nies have been sold too rapidly in the 
public market. For instance, the 
private equity groups that bought car
rental company Hertz in 2005
announced an IPO in just less than a
year, which prompted BusinessWeek
to call that move “rent-a-company.” 
A 2006 NBER paper by Lerner and
Jerry Cao of Boston College finds 
some evidence that leveraged buyouts
which went public after less than a year
performed much more poorly than
companies held longer. Such a strategy
would then seem futile since buyout
groups typically retain large ownership
stakes after the IPO and failure is too
costly for their reputation. 
But Lerner and Cao also find, 
overall, leveraged buyouts that later
offered shares to the public through 
an IPO “consistently outperform 
other IPOs and the stock market 
as a whole.” Moreover, they find no 
evidence that the returns of these
“reverse” leveraged buyouts deterio-
rated over time. This suggests that
private equity firms make their 
portfolio companies more valuable,
even long after an IPO. 
Another way to measure perform-
ance is by comparing the returns of 
a private equity fund to one that
invests in a stock market index such 
as the S&P500. In other words, which
would do a better job of generating
higher returns — a private or a public 
company? A well-cited 2005 Journal 
of Finance study by University 
of Chicago Graduate School of
Business economist Steven Kaplan
and Antoinette Schoar, an economist
at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, finds that the returns to 
private equity funds — gross of fees
paid to the general partners — beat
the returns on investing in the S&P
500 (the analysis includes venture cap-
ital and buyout funds). Other studies
come to similar findings.
However, Kaplan and Schoar’s
study finds that the same returns to
private equity funds — net of fees —
were roughly equal to the returns on
the S&P 500. So, while their findings
suggest that private equity firms cre-
ate value at the company level,
investors don’t seem to do better than
if they just put their money in a mar-
ket index fund. It would then seem
bizarre that investors pour so much
money in this asset class given the
poor returns. 
There may be other reasons why
investors put their money in private
equity funds. Investors might value
the option of participating in a 
future fund if participating in the first
one gives them access to the next.
Investors know that in this business, a
firm can get better at what they do
over time. Certain investors like big
investment banks may also value
investing in private equity funds for
the relationship that comes along with
it, because they value the possibility
that private equity firms will call upon
their consultation or underwriting
services. Or, it could be that investors
have a hard time comparing funds’
returns to that of the market index.  
But the best-performing funds 
within this larger group do better than
the market index even after fees. There
seems to be persistence in fund 
performance as well; that is, a good 
private equity firm can consistently
generate good returns. This persist-
ence is stronger than in other fund
types such as hedge funds and 
mutual funds. 
Feast, Famine, and the Future
As credit markets became more 
cautious over the past several months,
many predicted a substantial slow-
down and even the demise of what
they perceived was an overheated 
private equity market. But the boom-
and-bust nature of the industry is
nothing new. “This is a story we have
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Money from investors flows into
private equity when returns are 
perceived to be higher relative to other
types of investment. Together with
favorable credit conditions, which are
important to private equity because
the deals typically involve leveraging,
private equity firms can raise large
funds for their acquisitions. But more
capital available means more competi-
tion, which bids up the prices of
companies they buy. Moreover, when
the industry as a whole is doing well,
money also flows to inexperienced
groups who enter the market in the
hopes of replicating the success of the
industry’s best performers. Hence, as
the supply of capital goes up, returns
go down and investors pull out. Poor
performers leave the market, competi-
tion eases, returns go up, and the cycle
starts all over again. 
The buyout boom of the late 1980s,
culminating in Kohlberg Kravis
Robert & Co.’s takeover of RJR
Nabisco, is in many ways comparable
to the heady growth in buyouts in the
last few years. Both episodes were
marked by large amounts of capital,
record-breaking deals, intense public
scrutiny, and the use of debt securities
that fueled aggressive deal-making
(the junk bonds of the 1980s and the
collateralized loan obligations of
recent years). 
As in the earlier buyout wave, deal
volumes and returns on private equity
investment will likely drop as the 
current cycle turns. The difference,
however, is that the companies’ capital
structures are actually much safer
today, said Kaplan, who also spoke 
at the AEI conference. Even with 
the firms’ aggressive use of debt, 
companies’ debt levels are lower and
there is more of a cushion to make
repayments. Thus, in the event of a
recession, portfolio companies will
probably not experience the large
number of defaults that was seen in
the early 1990s. 
But even those who believe in the
merits of private equity worry that
some of the firms’ practices may be
weakening the very attributes that
have made them effective at what they
do. For instance, because the amount
of capital committed by investors has
increased tremendously in recent
years, the management fees collected
by the firm as a percentage of this
capital has likewise soared. Lerner
cited a study that shows partners’ pay
from “carried interest,” the perform-
ance motivator, is actually a relatively
small slice of their overall compensa-
tion and that much of the income
comes from fees. He thinks that this is
a concern because it might lead to pres-
sure for firms “to just do the safe thing,
rather than doing the right thing.” 
There are also worries about 
private equity firms themselves going
public — as Blackstone famously did
in 2007 — because it could undermine
the incentive structure that has been 
built into the limited partnership
arrangement. Private equity firms are
motivated to make deals work because
their reputations are on the line. Their
partnerships with investors have a
fixed lifetime, so if they want to 
raise another fund, they must show
investors that their past funds have
performed well. Thus, replacing the
funding provided by a partnership
with permanent capital from issuing
public stocks removes this important
motivator. 
As this relatively young industry
grows in size and influence, it is 
perhaps inevitable that there are
increasing pressures for more regula-
tion and transparency. Some are also
calling for private equity partners to
pay taxes on the carried interest based
on the income tax rate, rather than the
lower tax rate on capital gains. 
But those who think that private
equity will fall under the heavy weight
of criticism and its perceived excesses
might be disappointed. The industry
has been remarkably successful and it
generally has a good story to tell. 
Its influence extends even beyond the
firms that it operates. “If you have a
competitor who has private equity as a
significant owner and they are making
huge improvements, you had better
make similar improvements or you will
not be competitive,” said Wruck. The
message is clear: Companies that are
not backed by private equity firms will
be forced to shape up. Otherwise, they
may soon find themselves competing
against one that is.                            RF
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